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Abstract: In the absence of research into the specific motives for asexual 
erasure, the motives for bisexual erasure as theorised by Kenji Yoshino are 
appropriated for that purpose. The motives to 1) preserve the stability of sexual 
orientations 2) preserve sex as an important distinguishing trait and 3) preserve 
norms of monogamy, identified as underpinning bisexual erasure, are each 
applied to asexuality. The conclusions reached suggest that motives 2) and 3) to 
erase bisexuality could theoretically be strengthened in the case of asexual 
erasure, and motive 1), while not logically applicable to asexuality, nonetheless 
suggests an additional potential reason why asexuality is erased.  
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Lessons from bisexual erasure for asexual erasure 
Erasure is often cited as being the primary challenge facing the asexual 
community in its efforts to establish a position for itself next to the other 
“mainstream” sexual orientations. Asexual awareness movements, to borrow 
from Andrew Sullivan (1996) are “less a matter of complaint than of pride”. And 
the desire for pride is not easily dismissed as trivial. Yet neither is pride easy to 
cultivate. This is the challenge of asexual erasure and as challenges go it is a 
substantial one. However, as with all challenges in life, there is no better advice 
than to understand the challenge before confronting it. Understanding is what 
this essay sets out to achieve. 
Kenji Yoshino’s (2000) article The epistemic contract of bisexual erasure 
inspired me to do so and supplies the content of this essay. Until I came across 
Yoshino’s work one could have argued that I did not understand why erasure 
takes place insofar as I did not fully appreciate how it can function as a defence 
against the “threats” posed by an aberrant sexual community. Thanks to 
Yoshino’s analysis of the threat of bisexuality (and hence its erasure) I decided 
to investigate whether asexuality presents similar “threats” and if so whether it 
is erased on similar grounds. Yoshino describes three shared political 
motivations heterosexuals and homosexuals might have to erase bisexuality; 
these are the motives to 1) preserve the stability of their sexual orientations, 2) 
preserve sex as an important distinguishing trait and 3) preserve norms of 
monogamy. On the basis of these shared motivations Yoshino argues that 
heterosexuals and homosexuals - in a rare instance of cooperation - have 
unconsciously entered into a stable, epistemic contract of bisexual erasure. If 
similar political motivations to erase asexuality exist, we might be able to say 
that there also exists an epistemic contract of asexual erasure as entered into by 
allosexuals, a definition which includes heterosexuals, homosexuals, bisexuals 
and pansexuals. My means of investigating this possibility is, I hope, relatively 
straightforward to follow. Below, each of the three motivations for erasure is 
addressed in order and a different conceptualisation of them, as determined by 
the realities of asexuality, developed. It is in this way that I hope to shed some 
light on the nature of asexual erasure. 
I believe that there must somewhere be some value in what I have 
written insofar as those groups erasing asexuality are in large part the same as 
those groups erasing bisexuality, and so if Yoshino’s scholarship has our total 
trust, this essay deserves a small portion of it. I therefore hope that my own 
conclusions might help asexual and aromantic identified people better 
understand allosexual people’s attitudes towards them, provoke useful debate 
about erasure and of course combat that erasure. The more aware people are of 
the motivations underlying their discriminatory attitudes the more distance they 
might gain from their fear and the more favourable they might become towards 
the asexual community.  
 
Preliminaries 
Yoshino begins his discussion with two preliminary remarks. Adapted 
these are required before this investigation begins. The first is to ask whether 
asexuals benefit from being grouped together under one term. Asexuality is 
certainly an umbrella term which harbours just as much if not more diversity 
than those falling under the allosexual umbrella. Where allosexuality harbours 
heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality and pansexuality, asexuality 
harbours an equivalent four romantic orientations as well as aromantic asexuals, 
grey- and demi-asexuals, libidoist and non-libidoist asexuals, sex-positive and 
sex-repulsed asexuals, and autochorissexual asexuals. Clearly to talk of asexuals 
as a homogenous group is to neglect asexuality’s inner diversity, as indeed it is 
to talk of allosexuals. Nonetheless, I would urge that the ostensibly simplistic 
label of asexuality - and its opposite, allosexuality - is not without use. Given its 
position within society in contrast to the position of allosexuality, treating 
asexuals as a homogenous group is a necessary means to the end of greater 
awareness and acceptance of the fact that a percentage of the population, 
however diverse it might be, does not experience sexual attraction. Whether it 
will always be necessary to utilise the label once full awareness and acceptance 
is achieved is a moot point, but for now uniting under a label seems to me to be 
incumbent on those wishing to improve this community’s lot. 
Indeed, use of this label, if one projects into the future, is arguably 
beneficial for all sexualities. With a universally reduced emphasis on sex which 
might accompany asexual awareness could come less angst about sex and its 
lack in any given person’s life. Asexuality could become a safe place for those 
who feel they “lag behind”, since it is not just asexuals who are out of step but, I 
would hazard, an uncomfortable majority of all people. Awareness might also 
better equip people to understand and accept the nature of their relationships by 
normalising certain questions. Are their intimate relationships founded more on 
sexual or romantic attraction? Need the sexual aspect be so emphasised? Also, 
does one have aromantic relationships aside from one’s romantic ones? 
Recognising them as such might make them even more fulfilling. Moreover, with 
less emphasis on romance might come, again, less angst, this time thanks to the 
reduced emphasis on avoiding celibacy. Sex research will be challenged to its 
betterment as well. Most obviously, asexuality undermines what must be the 
major premise of that research: that we are all sexual beings. Parsing through 
the consequences of evidence to the contrary will undoubtedly call for a re-
evaluation of many other associated assumptions in many other associated 
domains of humanistic and scientific thought. This is by no means a 
comprehensive list of the benefits which might cascade out from asexual 
awareness, however, its potentially liberating influence should already be clear. 
That being said, and without having even touched on the burden of erasure for 
asexuals, we can now see how discussing asexuality as a group is worthwhile 
and fighting asexual erasure more worthwhile still. 
The second preliminary remark concerns what we mean when we speak of 
asexual erasure. It is useful here to reproduce Yoshino’s description of the 
roughly three levels of bisexual erasure that exist. First, there is class erasure 
which in the case of asexuality would be statements that it does not exist as a 
concept. We hear this when, for instance, asexuality is described as an internet 
fad or as “a stupid thing to suggest”; more shallow dismissal than deep or 
challenging erasure, but a frustration for those wishing for some engagement 
with the matter. At this class stage, erasure is practically synonymous with 
disinterest or ignorance but it nonetheless must be said that it does betray 
stronger and more forceful sentiments revealed at the next stage.  
This is individual erasure which charges the individual asexual as not being what 
they say they are. The self-identified asexual is not asexual but instead either 
lying to themselves, lying to others, repressing their true sexual feelings, 
hormonally imbalanced or some variation thereof. To borrow a phrase from 
Yoshino, asexuality is seen not as a “stable individual identity but a place from 
which a stable [allo]sexual identity is acknowledged or chosen” (p.20). And 
indeed, it is when asexual erasure challenges the stability of asexuality that it 
has particular force: by demanding that asexuality pass as being stable a lack of 
sexual desire must be proven – however, one cannot prove a negative, only a 
positive. This alone is immutable. And as Yoshino points out with regards to 
bisexuality, if asexuality is not viewed as an immutable orientation, it can never 
be viewed as a valid one. And moreover, any attempt to make something invalid 
(non-existent) visible is necessarily doomed to fail. Individual erasure of the sort 
that challenges the stability of asexuality therefore poses an existential threat to 
the cause of asexual awareness; asexuals must either choose to fit into the 
sexual matrix, or else be pushed into it against their will. 
The final level of erasure Yoshino identifies is that of outright 
delegitimation, or in more familiar terms, phobia. Asexuals being called “robotic” 
or “cold” is a common instance of this, while corrective rape is its most extreme 
instance.  This constitutes erasure since it chills the expression of asexuality. 
Consider this as the worst form of asexual erasure since where class erasure 
might be the equivalent of refusing to have a conversation about asexuality, and 
individual erasure opposition within that conversation, outright delegitimation is 
abuse in response to the proffered conversation.  
The preliminary remarks having been made, before we proceed to examine 
Yoshino’s ideas, three qualitative statements must also be made about this 
essay. First, in reproducing Yoshino’s arguments regarding bisexual erasure, I 
am not claiming that bisexuals are still similarly erased. I only wish to explore 
whether their political position as Yoshino analysed it in 2000 can still be usefully 
applied to asexuality. Second, this is not an essay which pretends that 
everything it states is sanctioned by or of use to the asexual community. Given 
that my finger does not rest on the pulse of asexual politics or research, this 
essay has been written, as it were, in a vacuum. If anything written is inaccurate 
or problematic I apologise and invite anyone reading it to correct me. And 
finally, the labels used to categorise people by group in this essay, though used 
frequently, must of course be understood as porous containers for the 
individuals they pretend to hold. Talk of this or that type of sexuality is therefore 
in the abstract. Consider the conclusions this essay draws as being like those an 
economist might draw from a theoretical model of the stock market: fallible 
when applied to the real world, but nonetheless indicative of some general trend 
worth exploring further.  
 
1. Preserving the stability of sexual orientations 
The first motivation for bi-erasure Yoshino discusses is that of relieving 
heterosexuals and homosexuals of the anxiety of identity interrogation. Briefly, 
Yoshino begins by pointing out that a heterosexual identity assures privilege to 
heterosexual people, and that this privilege is founded on heterosexuality’s 
stability as predicated in opposition to homosexuality. “[T]he denotation of any 
term is always dependent on what is exterior to it" (Fuss et al. 1991), such as 
the term “light” only being meaningful in opposition to the term “dark”. 
Bisexuality undermining that otherwise clear distinction between cross-sex and 
same-sex desire (bisexuality encapsulating both) therefore attacks 
heterosexuality’s stability. That is, any person exhibiting cross-sex desire, could 
at any point exhibit same-sex desire. Having complicated a valuable distinction, 
the erasure of bisexuality therefore becomes a live option.  
  
Could asexuality incite a similar motivation within allosexuals to erase 
asexuals? I believe not because, as seen earlier, one can only prove a positive 
(allosexuality) and not a negative (asexuality). One cannot easily doubt that one 
is allosexual and not asexual, but one can easily doubt that one is asexual and 
not allosexual. Therefore, in the abstract sense, it is asexuality more than 
allosexuality which struggles to guarantee its stability as an orientation. Indeed, 
the terms “allosexual” and “asexual” exist for the most part only within asexual 
circles and can therefore only be debated and doubted within those circles. 
Allosexuality’s stability is not predicated on opposition to asexuality. Asexuality’s 
stability is predicated on opposition to allosexuality, however. In contrast to 
bisexuality and heterosexuality then, it is asexuality more than allosexuality 
which we would expect to be motivated to erase the existence of its opposite 
(though this seems less likely to happen in practice). 
 
So much for drawing parallels between bisexual erasure and asexual erasure. 
However I would nonetheless not take this early difference as a lost opportunity 
to understand asexual erasure, for it usefully highlights the chasm that exists 
between the potential symbolism surrounding allosexuality and asexuality. 
Asexuality being a negative, allosexuality must be a positive. Asexuality is 
nothing; allosexuality something. Asexuality is abstinence, death and obscurity; 
allosexuality sex, life and clarity. That being the case, we have perhaps 
identified an additional “threat”, not identified by Yoshino, posed by the asexual 
community to the allosexual community: precisely its status as an obscure 
negative. We know that obscurity can invite the interest of few and the dismissal 
of many, and so it may be that asexuality is sometimes erased simply by virtue 
of its unverifiability. Regardless of whether mysteries are solved every day as 
knowledge systems progress, the mysterious nonetheless always threatens the 
boundaries of the world we already know, and it persistently demands our 
acknowledgement. Such might be the case for asexuality, it, among the other 
sexual minorities, arguably standing the furthest outside those boundaries, and 
suffering the penalty of erasure for it. Until the boundaries are moved outwards, 
therefore, that penalty will continue to be exacted. This might be a symbolic 
threat more than anything else, but it is a threat nonetheless. 
 
Next, turning to the more specific homosexual community’s political 
motivation to erase bisexuality, Yoshino begins by describing how a stable gay 
identity provides homosexuals with the immutability defence required for their 
political mobilisation. This is required since if homosexuality is stable as an 
orientation then it is also immutable and one cannot charge the homosexual with 
having deliberately chosen their orientation. Consequently, there exists one less 
reason to penalise homosexuals and therefore more room for their political 
mobilisation. The bisexual possibility undermines this defence, however. In its 
presence one can never definitively prove that one is stably monosexual since 
one’s activities are always compatible with that of a bisexual. With the bisexual 
possibility, all self-identified homosexuals therefore potentially have the choice 
to conform to the heterosexual mould, all of them potentially harbouring cross-
sex desires. And with the return of choice returns moral culpability and 
consequent oppression and powerlessness. Yoshino notes from this point of view 
that it is better for the homosexual community that bisexuality be invisible. 
 
Do asexual homoromantics pose a similar threat to the stability of 
homosexuality? Or rather (since homosexuality is addressed by Yoshino in this 
context as a sexual minority in need of the immutability defence), do asexual or 
grey-asexual homo/bi/panromantics pose a similar threat to the stability of each 
minority sexual orientation?  Certainly each asexual who also identifies as having 
a minority romantic orientation has one foot in the asexual camp and the other 
in a minority sexual camp. However it is hard to know whether these sexual 
communities found their ability to mobilise politically on the stability of their 
members’ sexual inclinations, romantic inclinations, or both. This is possibly 
because the question has never been asked. Would the case of the aromantic 
homo/bi/pansexual provide an answer to the question? No, for it is merely a 
variation of the question. From an abstract position then, we cannot say with 
certainty whether sexual minorities would be motivated to erase asexuality in 
the interests of preserving homogeneity. A pessimist might argue, however, that 
it is unlikely that the question of asexual homo/bi/panromantics and aromantic 
homo/bi/pansexuals would be uncontroversial within those sexual communities. 
It would not be controversial in the same way that bisexuality is for 
homosexuality, it bridging the gap between oppressed homosexuality and 
privileged heterosexuality, however, for some, it might all the same bring to 
bear unwanted associations between sexual minorities and the derided 
asexuality. Indeed, as pointed out earlier, that association would be stronger the 
more grey-asexuality homo/bi/panromantics express their identities. The more 
general topic of LGB+ motivations to erase asexuality will be broached in the 
conclusion (the “T” has been redacted here, a transgender orientation not 
constituting a reason to erase asexuality in this author’s view). 
 
 2. Preserving the stability of sex 
 
The second motivation for bisexual erasure Yoshino discusses is that of 
preserving sex as an important distinguishing trait people have. Having a sex is 
viewed as important as the prerequisite for being considered human. Hence, for 
instance, the "neonatal psychosexual medical emergency" (Kessler 1998) that is 
the response to babies born intersexed. Moreover to be a sexed as male or 
female is widely accepted to imply being attracted to the opposite sex, or, failing 
that, to experience sexual attraction exclusively towards one sex. But bisexuals, 
in refusing that the desired object must belong to a particular sex, devalue sex. 
We have already seen how bisexuality destabilises sexual orientation, and now it 
similarly destabilises the primacy of sex, of course inviting a penalty. 
 
We can immediately see how asexuals destabilise sex by a similar token. They 
do so not by opening up the possibility of sexual attraction to both sexes, but 
sexual attraction to neither. And one might argue that the destabilising potential 
here is greater than it is in bisexuality for two reasons. First, as Yoshino points 
out, the majority of bisexuals are not sex-blind in the sense that there is no 
difference between the sexual attraction they experience towards one sex as 
opposed to the other (Weinberg et al. 1994). This is a mere assumption on the 
part of non-bisexuals. Most bisexuals do distinguish between the sexes on the 
level of sexual attraction, though, granted, the sexes must have at least one 
more thing in common with each other for the bisexual than they do for the 
monosexual, that one thing being sexual attractiveness. Asexuals, however, and 
in particular aromantic asexuals, are more obviously sex blind when it comes to 
the objects of one’s attraction, that attraction being altogether absent. Asexuals 
do not refuse that a desired object must belong to a particular sex; they refuse 
that there must be a desired object at all. Asexuality is therefore more obviously 
destabilising for sex than bisexuality. It is also more radically destabilising, as 
we will see below. First, however, the claim of sex blindness must first be 
qualified at length in the case of those asexuals for whom attraction of forms 
other than sexual attraction exists, and also in the case of the autochorissexual 
asexual (defined below). 
 
These other forms of attraction are romantic and sensual attraction. First, 
to state things baldly, pure romantic attraction is more complex than pure (or 
primary) sexual attraction since a greater proportion of romantic attraction than 
sexual attraction involves attraction to an object insofar as it is a person and not 
just a body. Pure instances of sexual or romantic attraction might be infrequent 
- the two often emerging together - however this contingent fact does not 
undermine the validity of the claim. I contend that it is not sex which is most 
important for romantic attraction – sex being a bodily phenomenon – but gender 
which, in being a social phenomenon, is intertwined with personhood. Romantic 
asexuals may not therefore be gender blind (though they might be if they are bi- 
or panromantic), but a case still exists for their being sex blind. Indeed, a very 
significant proportion of asexuals identify as gender non-binary (Brotto et al., 
2010), perhaps a case of their sex blindness being directed inwards as well as 
outwards. To what extent this sex blindness destabilises sex as the term “sex” is 
defined when non-bisexuals defend it against bisexuals, or when allosexuals 
defend it against asexuals, is an open question. It will nonetheless be more 
destabilising than bisexuality is, however, because, although gender remains a 
dimension along which people are found attractive, the sexual dimension in 
question remains less important.  
 
And what of the sensual attraction some asexuals report feeling? That is, 
the “desire to engage in sensual acts with the person that the attraction is felt 
towards” (Asexuality.org 2006). This includes the enjoyment of tactile, aural, 
olfactory and visual interaction with an object of attraction. On the surface of it, 
sensual and sexual attraction seem very close to one another, the former being 
interpretable as a “softer” version of the latter. The boundary between sensual 
massaging and sexual petting, for instance, is not exactly clear. However, one 
can nonetheless argue that the boundary does exist. The asexual may well have 
a desire to explore their object of attraction using their senses, however sensual 
exploration is not a prelude to sexual exploration. For asexuals, sensual 
exploration remains sensual throughout. The asexual is therefore attracted to an 
object insofar as it is a non-erotic body. 
 
Is this enough for the claim that the sensual asexual is sex blind to remain 
valid? We can say that although this asexual might find bodies of a particular sex 
attractive, that attraction is towards those bodies not as sex objects but merely 
as sexed objects. So certainly, the asexual is sex blind if sex is understood in the 
sense of being something which is necessarily linked to the sex act and the 
attendant sexual pleasure. But this would be a thin definition of sex. A thicker 
definition of sex which allows room for sex simply being a biological 
phenomenon, and not one with an erotic dimension, does not allow for the 
sensual asexual being sex blind. Nonetheless, the suggested thin definition has 
some merit, for it teases out an important difference between the asexual and 
allosexual experience of the dimension of sex. The attraction the sensual asexual 
experiences towards a particular sex is importantly different from sexual 
attraction. In the same way that the difference between the appreciation of art 
and food is important. Where the appreciation of art is more or less wholly 
aesthetic and unconnected to biological compulsions, the appreciation of food, 
though often aesthetic, is very much governed by biological compulsions. In 
turn, sensual pleasures, such as those derivable from art as opposed to food, are 
pursued with less intensity than sexual pleasures.  As a result, and despite not 
being sex blind on the thick definition if they identify as sensual, the asexual’s 
perceptions of the two sexes must be significantly more similar to each other 
than the allosexual’s. This may manifest itself in the asexual being less 
motivated than the allosexual to publicly defend sex differences, just like the art 
lover is less motivated than the food lover to distinguish between that which 
they like and dislike. If forced to eat repulsive food one is bound eventually to 
become much more demoralised than the other made simply to hang dislikeable 
art on their wall. Sex, on the thin definition, is less important for the sensual 
asexual and they are in turn closer to being sex blind than the bisexual is. I 
therefore argue that the sensual asexual remains more destabilising for the 
dimension of sex than the bisexual and ought therefore to invite more erasure.  
 
We should finally consider the question of sex blindness in the case of the 
autochorissexual asexual. Autochorissexuality was first formally identified within 
the asexual community by Anthony Bogaert (2012) when he ascribed it to those 
people who experience sexual arousal by an object without any attendant sexual 
attraction towards the same object. Thus, there is what he calls a “‘disconnect’ 
between an individual’s sense of self and a sexual object/target”, meaning the 
autochorissexual has sexual fantasies or experiences arousal in response to 
erotica without any desire to take part in the sexual activities at hand. Assuming 
that a given autochorissexual’s sexual arousal is in response to fantasies or 
erotica involving only one sex, the claim that they are sex blind might seem 
difficult to defend. Such an asexual will be likely to categorise members of one 
sex as arousing, and members of the other as non-arousing. Clearly, on the 
thick definition of sex as a mere biological phenomenon, this particular asexual 
is not sex blind. And on the thin definition of sex as something necessarily linked 
to the sex act and sexual pleasure, one could also argue that this particular 
asexual is not sex blind either since the autochorissexual derives sexual pleasure 
from a particular sex.  
 
However, a similar move as was made in the case of the sensual asexual could 
also be made here since, although the autochorissexual experiences arousal, 
they do not experience attraction. The ‘disconnect’ between arousal and object 
of arousal makes for an important difference in the way in which the 
autochorissexual approaches that object in public and the way the allosexual 
approaches it. Notably, the autochorissexual theoretically has no compulsion to 
impose themselves on the arousing object (whether it be in fantasy or 
otherwise), whilst the allosexual does. The autochorissexual is able to remain 
privately detached whilst the allosexual must publicly engage, that is, initiate 
sex. Thus, once again, the importance of sex on the thin definition is less for the 
asexual compared to the allosexual. An analogy may help. If the 
autochorissexual is the art appreciator, then the allosexual is the art dealer, 
importantly invested and involved in the art world. The art dealer is dependent 
on the public distinctions made between different art forms, each art form 
constituting a different product; and in the absence of such engagement, the art 
appreciator has such dependence only insofar as those distinctions impact their 
own private enjoyment. They therefore have less need to impose those 
distinctions on others since they can very well get along without reaching an 
agreement with others on the matter. Translating this into the sexual world, in 
the absence of similar levels of engagement with the arousing sex as the 
allosexual, the autochorissexual is equivalently less invested in publicly 
defending sex differences. They need only attend to them privately. There is 
much more to be said about the importance and meaning of this public/private 
divide for the dimension of sex, however I hope it is nonetheless clear that, due 
to it, and even despite the presence of sexual arousal, the autochorissexual 
asexual is closer to being sex blind than the bisexual. 
 
The qualifications concerning sex-blindness now finished, in what way is the 
sex blindness of asexuals more radically destabilising for sex than the sex 
blindness of bisexuals? Yoshino points out that the distinguishing trait of sex is 
upheld as most important by society within the private realm as opposed to the 
public realm (“public” and “private” here signify “non-erotic” and “erotic” 
respectively for Yoshino, not “interpersonal” and “personal” as they did above for 
me). In fact, although the law attempts to eradicate sex differences as much as 
possible within that public realm (for instance, in employment), those efforts 
stop short of the private realm. Thus, while one cannot discriminate on the basis 
of sex as an employer, one may do so, and is in fact expected to, as a person 
seeking a sexual partner. Why this split? One reason may be because sex, on 
the thick definition, has its origin as a concept within the sex act. If there were 
no physical sex act in which two differently sexed bodies meet and, by and 
large, ensure the survival of the species, those sex characteristics which serve to 
mark the difference between bodies would no longer serve any necessary 
purpose. They could only conceivably serve contingent purposes like those that 
exist when we playfully categorise people according to some arbitrary physical 
characteristics. If the sex dimension is to be preserved the sex act cannot 
become an over-regulated activity, but must remain free. Hence the law’s laissez 
faire approach to the erotic realm. But, asexuals, not partaking in the sex act (at 
least not out of sexual desire), destabilise sex in the most radical way possible. 
They are indifferent to, and sometimes revolted by, the sex act, abandoning 
both the origin and much of the task of preservation of the dimension of sex as a 
thick biological concept. I say much of the task of preservation because, as we 
have seen, asexuals of the sensual and autochorissexual kind are not absolutely 
sex blind and therefore do, either in an aesthetic (as opposed to biological) or 
private (personal as opposed to interpersonal) way preserve the dimension of 
sex. But the most important point remains that the origin of the dimension is 
devalorised by the asexual and the practice which guarantees its existence 
undermined. Thus, for the two sets of reasons discussed, asexuality more 
thoroughly undermines the centrality of sex to human conducts than bisexuality 
and must therefore invite more erasure. 
 
3.  Preserving relationships 
The third and final motivation to erase bisexuality Yoshino discusses is that of 
preserving monogamy as a norm. There is a highly prevalent stereotype of 
bisexuals being promiscuous, captured by Yoshino in the opposition between 
“the monosexual as whole and the bisexual as surfeit” (p.32). And one important 
result of this stereotype is those dating bisexuals experiencing jealousy. It 
occurs because, out of a prejudiced belief in bisexual promiscuity, those dating 
bisexuals not only see themselves as being in competition with members of their 
own sex for their partner’s favour, but as also being in competition with 
members of the opposite sex whose sexually attractive qualities are 
unattainable. Out of fear that they cannot satisfy all of their bisexual partner’s 
desires, they therefore become jealous - a sentiment potentially one step away 
from hostility and erasure. As illogical and prejudiced the underlying 
assumptions are here they nonetheless persist.1 Such is some people’s 
sensitivity to the idea that their bisexual partner could at any time “go both 
ways”, that to carry oneself as a bisexual constitutes a moral transgression. It is, 
Yoshino says, like transgressing the norm of courtesy which stipulates that in 
order to preserve a monogamous relationship one must not continue alerting 
one’s partner to the different kinds of people one is attracted to. Thus 
understood, bisexuality is viewed as a threat to monogamy and therefore 
erased.  
Is asexuality a similar threat to monogamy? No, it is rather a bigger threat to 
something larger. Where bisexuals are viewed by their sexual partners who see 
themselves as unable to satisfy all of their desires as threatening, asexuals are 
viewable as more threatening since one actually cannot satisfy any of their 
(sexual) desires because, by and large, they do not exist. The asexual is 
unattainable by those who are sexually attracted to them, not because they 
move too “easily” through the world of sex, but because they are not part of that 
world in which every member harbours some form of lust for the other’s body. I 
contend that this provokes jealousy. Not jealousy provoked by those whom the 
                                                          
1
 As Paula Rust (1996) notes, it is just as illogical to believe that your partner requires 
two lovers of two different eye colours if they find both colours attractive, as it is to 
believe that they require two lovers of two different sexes if they find both sexes 
attractive. 
asexual might abandon one for, but provoked by the fact that the asexual will 
not join one sexually to begin with. The asexual sexually enclosed unto themself 
is, in the allosexual’s eyes, forever satisfied by themself, a competitor one can 
never ward off since the competitor and person competed for are one. And this 
is a more intractable moral transgression of the norm of courtesy not to alert 
one’s partner to whom one finds attractive because carrying oneself as asexual 
is not only to symbolically signal the presence of a competitor but also to conjoin 
oneself with them and - to stretch this metaphor - commit adultery with them. 
Of course, the asexual does not deny their partner’s, or potential partner’s, wish 
to satisfy them sexually out of ill will. However, under the sway of an allosexual 
worldview according to which all people are lustful and are all potentially 
mutually attracted towards each other, the asexual is a maverick presence. 
Thus, if one views sex and sexual fidelity as central to human life, then the 
asexual is not just a threat to monogamy as the bisexual is, but also a threat to 
intimate relationships in general. That is, whereas the bisexual is viewable as 
willing to engage in an intimate relationship (just without adequate 
commitment), the asexual (particularly the aromantic asexual) is viewable as 
unwilling to engage in an intimate relationship at all. As all sexual minorities 
know, it is when viewed as an outsider in an important way such as this that 
oppression can take on its worst form. In the case of the asexual unwilling to 
respond to any sexual advances at all (let alone sexual advances from a specific 
gender) I would worry that corrective rape becomes a live risk for asexuals. 
 
But here it must be clarified what is meant by “intimate relationship”. It is 
meant in the narrow sense of an emotional commitment founded on sexual 
attraction to and enjoyment of another. Of course very few people would claim 
that the sexual dimension alone is both necessary and sufficient for intimate 
relationships in general, however one needn’t explore the discourse surrounding 
relationships for too long before encountering claim after claim that the romantic 
reaches its fullest completion in the sexual. Attack this claim, therefore, and one 
essentially attacks intimate relationships in all their most cherished forms. The 
asexual, though sometimes preserving many of the relationship’s indispensable 
characteristics (romantic and sensual attraction chief among them), dispenses 
with its ostensibly most important one.2 
 
However, more important than the asexual broadly understood, the 
aromantic asexual must of course be considered, for it is here that the attack on 
intimate relationships is most pronounced. Whereas the romantic asexual 
preserves some indispensables of the intimate relationship, the aromantic 
asexual could be interpreted as preserving none. The jealousy and attendant 
erasure provoked is therefore potentially much greater since it may seem as if 
nothing one has to offer the aromantic as a potential partner, be it sexual or 
romantic, is adequate. The aromantic attacks relationships as understood in a 
broader romantic sense by committing emotional as well sexual adultery. At 
most, the aromantic only preserves intimate friendship as a form of human 
connection - not its reified older sibling. Asexuality therefore not only threatens 
monogamy but also the preservation of intimate relationships – an institution of 
                                                          
2 As an aside, I wonder if many allosexuals might in fact welcome this change in emphasis were it 
applied to their own circumstances. Nonetheless, I simultaneously wonder whether such a change 
is really very far away, whatever the potential support for it there might silently exist. Here we 
must examine how valid the empirical evidence for the universal importance of sexual attraction 
and activity is, and in turn whether the rolling influence of the sexual liberation of the 1960s is 
thereby as helpful as first maintained. Now that the asexual possibility exists, the help provided by 
sexual liberation might for the first time be justifiably understood as having been in some ways 
excessive. Although the asexual movement (and many things besides) would not exist were it not 
for the LGBT+ movement which grew out of that sexual liberation, this does not preclude asexuals 
from fairly criticising certain aspects of it. We shall return to this in the conclusion. 
 
obvious centrality within our society given its associations with procreation, 
family and property. 
 
Further considerations 
 
Bisexual erasure is undoubtedly powerful; however, certain points made 
within this essay could lead one to conclude that asexual erasure must be even 
more oppressive. Asexuality does not stop at changing the rules of the game of 
sexuality as bisexuality does, but broadly refuses to even play the game. It is 
not that sex is undermined because the asexual is simply sex blind (a blindness 
which, incidentally, is greater than that sex blindness found in bisexuals); 
rather, sex is undermined since the private erotic realm that produces and 
sustains it does not exist for the asexual. And it is not so much monogamy that 
is threatened by asexuality (though the sexual dynamics within it are), but 
instead intimate relationships in general – a threat presented most acutely by 
the aromantic asexual. Such is the more important destabilising power of 
asexuality for the norms allosexuality would have preserved, and consequently 
greater is the erasure asexuality ought to receive. 
 
Nonetheless, if we consider the first political motivation for bisexual 
erasure, asexuality appears much more muted as a threat. Asexuality is not a 
threat to orientation stability in the same way that bisexuality is because, since 
one cannot prove a negative, the existence of asexuals is very unlikely to call 
into question somebody’s existing, positive sexual attraction towards others. 
Indeed, though this engenders no motivation to erase asexuality, it nonetheless 
makes it very easy to do so. However, the point we can draw from this 
characterisation of asexuality as unverifiable which is that it stands for the 
mysterious – the disconcerting unknown which we would like nothing better but 
to disappear – must be remembered. I speculated whether this constitutes an 
additional threat to sexual norms, in addition to those identified by Yoshino with 
regards to bisexuality. Apart from the potentially positive world effects 
asexuality has been above-identified as having, its status as the mysterious, I 
argue, is an important reason for its erasure.  
Before finishing I would not be satisfied unless I briefly touched upon four 
final points. The first three points are further ancillary lessons we might learn 
from Yoshino about asexual erasure.  
The first point concerns the additional difficulties asexuals might 
experience in reinforcing asexual awareness even after that awareness is 
virtually won. Yoshino points out that it is difficult to communicate bisexuality, 
his example of this being that of a couple holding hands in public. Without 
devoting thought to what is actually the case when one sees such a couple, 
depending on their gender, one very often assumes that the members of that 
couple are either heterosexual or homosexual. Neither is read as being bisexual, 
a fact which entraps bisexuality in invisibility. The matching difficulty for 
asexuals is clear. It is that when holding hands with someone the asexual will be 
read as being what they, at least, call allosexual. And, of course, when holding 
hands with nobody, this is no indication of asexuality though it might in fact best 
symbolise it for some people. Thus, like bisexuality, asexuality is further 
hampered by, in addition to everything else, being physically invisible. This is a 
minor lesson but one I thought worth recording. 
The second point Yoshino teaches again concerns grey-asexuality. One 
way in which bisexuality is erased on an individual level is by reading sexuality 
as a synchronic phenomenon. This reading conceptualises one’s true sexuality as 
only being verifiable with reference to one’s current sexual practices. According 
to it, past and future practices are of no consequence. Obviously then, unless a 
bisexual person does not concurrently have multiple sexual partners of two 
sexes, they do not exist as bisexual. The same trap might open for grey-
asexuals, and moreover, if we recall the previous pitfalls to acceptance the grey-
asexual faces, the threat of erasure here might be greater still. This is because 
the grey-asexual cannot, like the bisexual, concurrently have multiple partners 
of different sexes in order to “prove” their sexuality since it is not necessarily the 
case that the grey-asexual desires differently sexed partners (unless they are a 
bisexual grey-asexual). The grey-asexual merely sometimes desires a sexual 
partner and sometimes doesn’t. A negative being unprovable, nothing can 
defend the grey-asexual’s orientation against the synchronic reading of 
sexuality. The grey-asexual can only ever be allosexual. 
The third point concerns what we can learn from bisexual erasure about 
the potential for grey-asexual erasure which inhabits the middle ground between 
allosexuality and asexuality, like bisexuality inhabits the middle ground between 
heterosexuality and homosexuality. Like bisexuality, grey-asexuality would be 
more likely to motivate erasure by both allosexuals and asexuals, since it 
undermines the distinction between sexual desire and no sexual desire. It 
threatens both with the possibility that they might be their opposites. Indeed, 
Yoshino’s points out that that the lesbian community is potentially motivated to 
erase bisexuality because it introduces cross-sex desire and men into their 
otherwise exclusively homosexual and female realm. He argues that the 
presence of cross-sex desire within the lesbian community signifies capture by 
the patriarchy and therefore motivates the erasure of bisexuals (the holders of 
cross-sex desires) by lesbians (those, in some respects, attempting to construct 
a male-free place of safety). If this is correct, the position of grey-asexuals 
might be better understood – grey-asexuals introducing sexual desire into the 
asexual community. I am not au fait with asexual politics (or indeed lesbian 
politics), but I nonetheless know that there exists in some asexual quarters a 
desire to construct what might be called sex-free places of safety. Of course, the 
exact different meanings of the terms male-free, sex-free, and places of safety 
in this discussion must be carefully kept apart. Oppression of lesbian women by 
a patriarchy and oppression of asexuals by an “allosexual ideology” are very 
different things and I do not wish to draw problematic comparisons between the 
two. There is one comparison which I do hope will be helpful for asexuals, 
however. Simply, in both cases, a sexual minority is oppressed by a distinct 
majority and seeks somewhere where it can escape that oppression. One 
possible reaction by lesbians to the patriarchy, Yoshino points out, is an 
intolerance of those who might bring lesbians closer to their oppressor, namely 
bisexuals. And, perhaps one analogous reaction by asexuals to the allosexual 
ideology is, or will be, an intolerance of grey-asexuals. We saw when discussing 
the first motivation for bisexual erasure that it was grey-asexuality rather than 
asexuality which had the most in common with bisexuality and so I will only 
warn that a similarity might exist here as well. The asexual community might 
only be very young and in the initial stages of developing a collective identity, 
however it is better to be forewarned about the potential for grey-asexual 
erasure within the asexual community than only to become aware of that 
potential after it has already begun expressing itself.  
And finally, the fourth point I would like to touch on concerns some of my 
own thoughts as to why asexual erasure occurs. They are thoughts which, I 
believe, are more satisfyingly tailored to the asexual community than the 
conclusions I draw out of Yoshino’s work are because, unlike bisexuals who 
experience erasure by other, similar allosexuals, I would contend that asexuals 
experience erasure by allosexuals necessarily dissimilar from themselves. In not 
experiencing sexual attraction of any kind, I contend that asexuality is 
consequently one important step further away from those who erase it than 
bisexuality is. As a result, (and I say this aware that the relation of asexuality to 
the LGB+ community is in some quarters under debate) the potential for an 
epistemic contract between other sexual minorities to erase asexuality is 
stronger. As the LGB+ movement gains more momentum it might be that the 
asexual faction wishing to claim a place within it is perceived by some opponents 
as pulling the LGB+ community’s upward spiral back down again. That is, the 
ostensibly prudish behaviours of asexuals might seem to be a step back to a 
time when sex and sexuality were repressed. For instance, we could hazard that 
the silence which existed before the sexual liberation of the 1960s would not 
have constituted as big a problem for asexuals and might in fact have left them 
better off. That being the case, the LGB+ opponent to asexuality asks “are 
asexuals going to catch up with us or will we have to turn back for them?” The 
opponent is of course hardly likely to turn back given the struggle it has been to 
come so far, and so catching up is perceived to be the only available answer. 
That is, in order to nullify its threat to the LGB+ cause asexuality might be 
erased. I argue that this might be an added political motivation within the LGB+ 
community to erase asexuality. 
Asexuality is not an identity which has aroused the attention it is due 
because to pay attention to it would be - to echo the earlier charge that 
asexuality is only a “place from which a stable [allo]sexual identity is 
acknowledged or chosen” – like trying to smell a flower before it has bloomed. If 
there is no fragrance there is no reason to try and smell it. This is erroneous 
reasoning, and the more asexuals share about themselves, the more erroneous I 
hope others will see the worldview behind that metaphor as being. Asexuality is 
not a stop on the way to something better, it is a proper destination in its own 
right. If people believe they are justified in comparing asexuals to flower buds, 
we could retort that they are standing in the wrong part of the garden. Find us, 
and the neglect we suffer is easy to see. I hope this essay may work towards 
bringing about that tipping point asexuality deserves. 
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